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HYMENOPTERA: MECHANISMS, COSTS, AND THE EVOLUTION OF SPLIT
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Abstract. Because workers in the eusocial Hymenoptera are more closely related to sisters than to brothers, theory
predicts that natural selection should act on them to bias (change) sex allocation to favor reproductive females over
males. However, selection should also act on queens to prevent worker bias. We use a simulation approach to analyze
the coevolution of this conflict in colonies with single, once-mated queens. We assume that queens bias the primary
(egg) sex ratio and workers bias the secondary (adult) sex ratio, both at some cost to colony productivity. Workers
can bias either by eliminating males or by directly increasing female caste determination. Although variation among
colonies in kin structure is absent, simulations often result in bimodal (split) colony sex ratios. This occurs because
of the evolution of two alternative queen or two alternative worker biasing strategies, one that biases strongly and
another that does not bias at all. Alternative strategies evolve because the mechanisms of biasing result in accelerating
benefits per unit cost with increasing bias, resulting in greater fitness for strategies that bias more and bias less than
the population equilibrium. Strategies biasing more gain from increased biasing efficiency whereas strategies biasing
less gain from decreased biasing cost. Our study predicts that whether queens or workers evolve alternative strategies
depends upon the mechanisms that workers use to bias the sex ratio, the relative cost of queen and worker biasing,
and the rates at which queen and worker strategies evolve. Our study also predicts that population and colony level
sex allocation, as well as colony productivity, will differ diagnostically according to whether queens or workers evolve
alternative biasing strategies and according to what mechanism workers use to bias sex allocation.
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Studies of sex allocation in eusocial Hymenoptera (ants,
bees, wasps) have resulted in important tests of evolutionary
theories of sex allocation, inclusive fitness, and parent-off-
spring conflict. This importance arises from haplodiploid sex
determination, which results in an asymmetry in relatedness
in which workers are more closely related to sisters than to
brothers (Hamilton 1964; Trivers and Hare 1976). As a con-
sequence, workers favor a more female-biased sex allocation
than the queen, leading to intracolony conflict over the sex
ratio. Because workers are generally not mated and have
limited opportunities for reproduction, their fitness results
primarily from rearing eggs produced by their mother (the
queen). As a result, indirect selection should act on workers
to change, or bias, colony investment in favor of reproductive
females. However, because queens are equally related to
daughters and sons, selection should act on queens to prevent
worker bias (Trivers and Hare 1976; Bourke and Franks 1995;
Crozier and Pamilo 1996). Empirical studies have provided
substantial evidence consistent with workers biasing invest-
ment and queens acting to prevent such bias, supporting the
occurrence of this conflict (Trivers and Hare 1976; Nonacs
1986; Boomsma 1989; Bourke and Franks 1995; Crozier and
Pamilo 1996; Chapuisat and Keller 1999; Beekman and Rat-
nieks 2003; Mehdiabadi et al. 2003).
Although asymmetrical relatedness of workers to females
and males may explain global patterns of sex allocation
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across populations, eusocial Hymenoptera exhibit another sex
allocation characteristic of great significance: colonies within
populations often produce highly divergent sex ratios. Some
produce primarily or exclusively males and others produce
primarily or exclusively females (Nonacs 1986; Boomsma
and Grafen 1990). Theory has proposed that these bimodally
distributed, or split, colony sex ratios result from facultative
worker biasing in response to differences in relatedness asym-
metry among colonies, and a number of studies support this
hypothesis (e.g., Boomsma and Grafen 1990, 1991; Mueller
1991; Queller et al. 1993; Chan and Bourke 1994; Sundstro¨m
1994; Sundstro¨m et al. 1996; Queller and Strassmann 1998).
Differences among colonies in relatedness asymmetry can
arise from variation in queen mating frequency, partial work-
er reproduction, and variable numbers of reproductive queens
per colony (e.g., Boomsma and Grafen 1990). However, split
sex ratios are common even in populations of eusocial Hy-
menoptera where differences in relatedness asymmetry do
not appear important (e.g., Hasegawa 1994; Pamilo and Sep-
pa¨ 1994; Vargo 1996; Helms 1999; Bourke and Ratnieks
2001; Passera et al. 2001; Fournier et al. 2003; Helms et al.
2004). In some cases, there is evidence that split sex ratios
may result from queens exhibiting alternative biasing strat-
egies, with some queens producing mostly male eggs and
others mostly female eggs (e.g., Helms 1999; Helms et al.
2000; Bourke and Ratnieks 2001; Passera et al. 2001). We
use the term alternative biasing strategies to refer to cases
in which queens (or workers) exhibit two distinct pure strat-
egies; for example, whereby some queens produce only male
eggs whereas others produce both sexes at equal frequency
(or in which some workers eliminate all males while others
eliminate none).
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How polymorphisms in sex allocation can evolve in the
absence of differences in relatedness asymmetry is largely
unexplored. However, in a recent model, we explored the
effect of costs of sex-ratio manipulation by workers on colony
sex allocation (Reuter et al. 2004). We found that evolution
leads to the emergence of two alternative worker strategies
when the costs of biasing increase in a decelerating manner
with increasing bias. One of these strategies is to manipulate
the sex ratio up to complete female production and the other
is to not manipulate at all. While providing an explanation
for split sex ratios in the absence of relatedness asymmetry,
that model assumed a constant primary sex ratio and did not
allow for the coevolution of queen and workers strategies.
Here we present a study that extends the previous analyses
in several important ways. First, the present analysis allows
for worker and queen strategies to coevolve in sex-ratio con-
flict, whereby the manipulation of investment by both parties
is assumed to have a cost in terms of reduced colony pro-
ductivity. Second, we explicitly model the two most likely
mechanisms of worker sex ratio manipulation, that is the
elimination of male brood versus the reallocation of worker-
destined female larvae to the queen developmental pathway.
Third, we address how the resolution of sex-ratio conflict is
affected by the evolutionary trajectory that queen and worker
strategies take during the process of coevolution. To do so,
we use a simulation approach rather than analytical modeling.
This approach allows us to manipulate the rate at which queen
and worker biasing phenotypes evolve by varying the effect
that mutant strategies have on queen and worker biasing. It
also allows for analysis of the coevolutionary process. Our
study provides a new approach to the study of sex allocation
in eusocial Hymenoptera by investigating the importance of
mechanisms and costs of sex-ratio biasing, and provides fun-
damental insights into the evolutionary mechanisms that can
result in split colony sex ratios.
MODELS OF QUEEN-WORKER CONFLICT
We address the problem of coevolving queen and worker
strategies using a simulation approach. During simulations,
queen and worker strategies compete against each other over
many generations, leading to stable coevolutionary equilibria.
Our models assume that workers are sterile and all colonies
have a single queen (monogyny) inseminated by a single male
(monandry). We model the degree that queens and workers
act to change (bias) the sex ratio as pure (nonfacultative)
strategies and assume that they are effective only during the
period(s) when reproductive offspring are produced. Queen
and worker strategies are associated randomly according to
their frequencies in the population. This implies that queen
and worker strategies are genetically unlinked and completely
independent in their expression; for example, a queen mech-
anism affecting the primary sex ratio (egg insemination rate)
is presumed to have no phenotypic effect in sterile workers,
whereas a worker mechanism affecting the secondary sex
ratio (reproductive brood rearing) is presumed to have no
phenotypic effect in queens (e.g., Lynch 1987; Mock and
Parker 1997; Ko¨lliker et al. 2000; Cheverud 2003). Colonies
produce male and female sexuals (hereafter referred to simply
as males and females) in proportions determined by the strat-
egies applied by each colony’s queen and workers. For sim-
plicity, we assume that all colonies have equal lifetime re-
sources and that the cost of producing a female is identical
to the cost of producing a male. The assumption of equal
production costs simplifies calculations by equating the nu-
merical sex ratio with the investment sex ratio and has no
effect on the evolutionary outcomes we address because se-
lection acts on total investment in the sexes rather than their
numbers, regardless of the cost of producing a male versus
a female (e.g., Fisher 1958).
Fitness of Queen and Worker Strategies
The fitness of queen and worker strategies over one gen-
eration is modeled as a function of five parameters: the sex
allocation in the colony (expressed as the proportion of a
colony’s resources invested in females, fi), the sex allocation
in the overall population (F), the relatedness values to the
sexuals produced (females: rf, males: rm), and the costs of
sex-ratio biasing for queens and workers (gQW). All param-
eters are summarized in Table 1. Using a standard notation
(e.g., Boomsma and Grafen 1991; Pamilo 1991) we define
fitness (a) of queens (aQ) and workers (aW) in colony i within
a population of colonies (1 . . . N) as:
(1 2 g ) f (1 2 g )(1 2 f )QW i QW ii ia 5 r · 1 r .i f mN N
[(1 2 g ) f ] [(1 2 g )(1 2 f )]O OQW j QW jj jj51 j51
(1)
In our models, we employ life-for-life values of relatedness
(e.g., Grafen 1986), where relatedness of queens to females
and males is 0.5, whereas the relatedness of workers to fe-
males is 0.75, and the relatedness of workers to males is 0.25.
These values imply outbreeding and a very large population
size, which is realized in our simulations (see below).
Biasing Mechanisms
The effects of queen and worker biasing on colony sex
allocation depend upon the mechanisms by which they bias.
This section details the biasing mechanisms included in our
simulations.
Queens produce the primary sex ratio
Our model assumes that queens alter colony sex allocation
by varying the primary sex ratio (the sex ratio of eggs laid
by the queen). The primary sex ratio has been proposed as
a powerful way for queens to bias sex allocation (Bulmer
1981; Passera et al. 2001; Reuter and Keller 2001), and em-
pirical evidence suggests that in a number of species queens
do alter colony sex allocation by varying the primary sex
ratio of male (haploid) and female (diploid) eggs (e.g., Aron
et al. 1994, 1995; Keller et al. 1996; Passera et al. 2001).
Queen variance in the temporal availability of haploid and
diploid eggs (Pamilo and Rosengren 1983; Bourke and Rat-
nieks 2001) is equivalent to varying the primary sex ratio in
our models.
We define the degree of queen sex-ratio bias, BQ, as the
deviation of the primary sex ratio from a value lambda, which
2628 KEN R. HELMS ET AL.
TABLE 1. Summary of model parameters.
Parameter Description
a Fitness of queens (aQ) and workers (aW) (defined by eq. 1).
gQW Colony costs from queen and worker biasing in proportion of colony productivity (fitness) lost. gQW is the sum
of queen costs (gQ) and worker costs (gW).f Proportion of colony reproductive resources invested in females after queen and worker bias.
1 2 f Proportion of colony reproductive resources invested in males after queen and worker bias.
r Relatedness of queens or workers to females (rf) and males (rm).
l Proportion female eggs in the primary sex ratio in the absence of queen biasing (l is 0.5 in our analyses).
BQ Queen bias (change) in the proportion female eggs in the primary sex ratio from l (BQ ranges from zero to
20.5 in our analyses).
BW Worker bias (change) of the primary sex ratio. When workers eliminate males, BW is the proportion of avail-
able males in the primary sex ratio that workers eliminate. When workers directly increase female produc-
tion, BW is the proportion of available diploid eggs in the primary sex ratio that become females because of
the action of workers (BW ranges from 0 to 1 regardless of how workers bias).
E Number of eggs the queen produces divided by the number of eggs that can be reared as reproductives (E 5
5.0 in our analyses).
CQ The cost parameter for queen biasing. The cost of queen biasing is CQ multiplied by zBQz.
CW The cost parameter for worker biasing. When workers bias by increasing female production, the cost of work-
er biasing (gW) is CW multiplied by the proportion of all available eggs they bias to become females. When
workers bias by eliminating males, the cost of worker biasing is either gW1 or gW2 (see below).
BLimit The maximum proportion of males that workers can eliminate without eliminating those that could be reared
in addition to all available females with available resources. This only applies to cases where workers bias
by eliminating males.
gW1 Cost to worker biasing (gW) when workers eliminate males and BW , BLimit. gW1 is CW multiplied by BW.
gW2 Cost to worker biasing (gW) when workers eliminate males and BW . BLimit. gW2 is gW1 added to the cost of
eliminating any males that could have been reared in addition to all available females with available re-
sources (see eq. 4).
FIG. 1. The number of eggs that can be reared relative to the
number the queen produces determines how much queens and work-
ers can bias the sex ratio before they reduce the size of the repro-
ductive brood. The primary sex ratio in the absence of queen biasing
is assumed equal, and queen biasing ranges from no bias (0.5) to
producing all male eggs (1.0). The lines indicate where the female
eggs available to rear are equal to those that can be reared (i.e.,
where BW 5 BLimit (eq. 4) under three egg availabilities. E is the
number of eggs produced divided by the number of eggs potentially
reared as reproductives.
is the primary sex ratio in the absence of queen bias. The
primary sex ratio (proportion females) produced by the queen
in colony i is then: l 1 BQ.
We only consider selection on queens to decrease the pro-
portion of female brood and accordingly BQ can range from
2l (only male eggs are produced) to zero (queens do not
bias). This restriction in the parameter range is justified be-
cause we assume the absence of local mate competition, a
condition under which selection might act on queens to pro-
duce female-biased sex ratios (e.g., Hamilton 1967; Cremer
and Heinze 2002).
We assume the default sex ratio lambda to be equal to one
half. This value is the queen equilibrium sex ratio, and may
be predicted prior to the evolution of queen-worker conflict
(e.g., Fisher 1958). In addition, if queens exert no control
over the primary sex ratio, a random mix of diploid and
haploid eggs should, on average, occur, also resulting in an
equal frequency of male and female eggs. Varying lambda
in analyses showed that values differing from one half did
not result in qualitatively different conclusions from those
we present.
Queen egg production. A fundamental, yet rarely ad-
dressed factor in queen-worker conflict is the availability of
eggs (Pamilo 1991; Reuter and Keller 2001; Roisin and Aron
2003). In fact, workers cannot adaptively bias sex allocation
unless eggs produced by the queen are in excess of those that
can be reared as reproductives with available resources. Oth-
erwise, worker bias of the sex ratio would only reduce re-
productive output. To describe the availability of surplus eggs
in the colony we define a parameter E as the ratio of the
number of eggs produced by the queen over the number that
can be reared as reproductives. For the reason outlined above,
E must be greater than 1.0 for the evolution of worker biasing
to evolve by natural selection. In our analyses, we assume
that E 5 5 and eggs are fairly abundant relative to those that
can be reared as reproductives. For simplicity, we also assume
that E does not vary among colonies. How queen and worker
biasing affects brood reduction under different values of E
is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Worker biasing mechanisms
Workers can alter the primary sex ratio produced by the
queen before sexuals are produced to result in a secondary,
or final reproductive sex ratio. Two general mechanisms seem
most likely: workers can eliminate males and redirect re-
sources to the production of females or they can influence
the caste determination of diploid eggs to increase the pro-
duction of females (Pamilo 1991; Passera and Aron 1996;
Reuter and Keller 2001; Hammond et al. 2002). We will
determine the effects of these different mechanisms with sep-
arate analyses.
When workers eliminate males. We assume that workers
eliminate some proportion of males in the primary sex ratio
and then rear the remaining males (along with females) at
the proportion in which they occur in the remaining brood.
So long as diploid eggs occur, increasing male elimination
indirectly results in increasing the proportion of females in
the reproductive brood.
If BW is the proportion of males in the primary sex ratio
that workers eliminate, the secondary sex ratio following
worker bias in colony i ( fi; eq. 1) is given by
(l 1 B )Qif 5i (l 1 B ) 1 [1 2 (l 1 B )] 2 B [1 2 (l 1 B )]Q Q W Qi i i i
(2)
where l 1 BQ is the primary sex ratio in proportion females
and 1 2 (l 1 BQ) is the primary sex ratio in proportion
males.
When workers increase female production. We assume
that workers increase the proportion of females produced by
redirecting a proportion BW of surplus eggs in the colony to
the production of sexual females. The number of male eggs
raised remains unaltered. The secondary sex ratio in colony
i ( fi; eq. 1) after worker biasing is
(l 1 B ) 1 B (l 1 B )(E 2 1)Q W Qi i if 5i (l 1 B ) 1 B (l 1 B )(E 2 1) 1 [1 2 (l 1 B )]Q W Q Qi i i i
(3)
where (l 1 BQ) is the proportion of eggs available that would
be reared as females in the absence of worker biasing, E is
the ratio of eggs available to eggs reared, ((E 2 1) (l 1 BQ))
is the proportion of additional female eggs that workers could
rear as females, and (1 2 (l 1 BQ)) is the proportion of males
that are reared in the absence of worker bias.
Queen and Worker Biasing Costs
Queen costs
Sex-ratio biasing is assumed to incur costs in terms of
colony productivity (Ratnieks and Reeve 1992; Chapuisat et
al. 1997; Reuter et al. 2004). Queen costs may arise from
decreased colony growth and productivity, and increased col-
ony mortality stemming from a limitation of female eggs
available for worker production. Queen costs may also arise
from the developmental costs of queen biasing mechanisms.
Queen costs are assumed to increase linearly with the degree
of queen bias, with a slope equal to a cost parameter CQ.
Cost to the colony in productivity (fitness) resulting from
queen bias (gQ) is thus gQ 5 CQzBQz.
Worker costs
Worker costs (gW) arise from the nonrecoverable resources
invested in males prior to their elimination, or the cost of
reproductive brood size reduction that can arise if workers
eliminate males when resources are available to rear them in
addition to any available females. They can also arise from
decreased productivity due to channeling diploid eggs into
the production of females rather than workers (Pamilo 1991;
Reuter and Keller 2001), and from the developmental costs
of biasing mechanisms. Depending upon how workers bias,
their cost is either a function of the total number of available
males they eliminate; or a function of the total available
diploid eggs biased toward the preferred female reproductive
caste.
When workers eliminate males. The elimination of males
can cause two kinds of costs. The first (gW1) is a mechanistic
cost resulting from the resources lost by replacing male brood
by female brood. This cost is assumed to increase linearly
with the proportion of males eliminated. The slope of increase
is CW and hence gW1i 5 CWBWi(1 2(l 1 BQi)).
A second cost, gW2, is due to brood reduction and arises
if eliminated males cannot be replaced with females due to
a lack of diploid brood. This can occur because queen biasing
of the primary sex ratio (increasing male eggs) must, at some
point, result in female eggs being limited (Herbers et al. 2001;
Reuter and Keller 2001). The point at which male elimination
results in reducing reproductive output, BLimit, occurs where
the number of eliminated males is equal to the number of
surplus brood available for raising (Fig. 1). Therefore
E 2 1
B 5 . (4)Limit [1 2 (l 1 B )]EQ
If workers eliminate males at a proportion below BLimit, col-
ony productivity is reduced due to the mechanical cost gW1
alone (i.e., gWi 5 gW1i). However, if worker biasing goes
beyond that point (i.e., BW . BLimit), then the cost attributed
to workers in colony i, gWi, is gW2i, where
B 2 BW Limitig 5 g 1 [1 2 (g )][1 2 (l 1 B )]W2i W1i W1i Qi5 61 2 BLimit
(5)
This equation results in a cost of gW1i when BW 5 BLimit, that
then increases in a linear manner to 1.0 (100% cost and zero
fitness) when BQ 5 20.5 and BW 5 1.0 (when queens produce
only male eggs and workers eliminate all males). An example
of how costs change when workers eliminate males is illus-
trated in Figure 2.
When workers increase female production. The cost due
to a reallocation of worker-destined brood to female devel-
opment is assumed to be a linear function of the degree of
bias (BWi). The slope of increase is CW, and cost is given by
gW 5 CWBWi(l 1 BQi).
Because workers do not eliminate brood, the cost of re-
allocating females is not affected by brood limitation.
In our analyses, we explored the effect of costs of sex-
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FIG. 2. Increase in the costs of sex-ratio biasing when workers
eliminate males. Here, the cost parameter for queen biasing (CQ)
is 0.3 and the cost parameter for worker biasing (CW) is 0.1. There
are five times more eggs available than can be reared as reproduc-
tives (E 5 5). Costs are a linear function of the amount of bias;
however, from the point where biasing by queens and workers re-
sults in reared eggs being equal to available eggs, costs rise sharply
and are equal to 1.0 when queens produce only male eggs and
workers eliminate all males (eq. 5).
ratio manipulation by using cost parameters, ranging from
small to large, that is, from 0.1 to 0.5, by increments of 0.1.
Because both queen and worker biasing costs affect colony
productivity, colony costs (gQW in eq. 1) are the sum of queen
and worker costs within a colony: gQW 5 gQ 1 gW.
Determining Equilibrium Bias and Sex Allocation
We employed simulations of evolution over a large number
of generations to determine equilibrium strategies. Queen and
worker biasing strategies were paired randomly to form col-
ony phenotypes, each of which produced a sex ratio defined
by equations (2) or (3). The fitness of each queen and worker
strategy in each colony was calculated based on the sex ratio
of colony phenotypes and the population sex ratio using equa-
tion (1). The frequencies of the strategies in the next gen-
eration then either increased or decreased according to their
fitness in the current generation. We assumed an arbitrarily
large population size of 1,000,000 colonies. Accordingly, a
strategy was eliminated (considered extinct) whenever its fre-
quency dropped below 0.000001. Simulations were run until
the frequency of biasing strategies stabilized. The number of
generations required to attain equilibrium differed according
to the parameters being analyzed, but generally ranged from
10,000 to 100,000. The simulations were conducted with a
computer algorithm written in Maple 6 (Waterloo Maple,
Inc., Waterloo, Ontario). A more detailed explanation of the
simulation procedure is supplied in the Appendix.
Our simulations started with a first generation where nei-
ther queens nor workers biased (BW and BQ 5 0). In each
subsequent generation, one queen and one worker mutant
arose from one randomly drawn existing (parental) biasing
strategy, biasing one increment more or less than the parental
strategy. Each mutation increased or decreased biasing with
equal probability. Because preliminary data showed that the
magnitude of incremental change in queen versus worker
mutant strategies from the parental strategy affected evolu-
tionary outcomes, we varied those increments such that they
were: 0.05: 0.1 (queen , worker), 0.05: 0.05 (queen 5 work-
er), and 0.05: 0.025 (queen . worker). Which existing strat-
egy gave rise to a mutant strategy was determined at random,
with the probability proportional to their frequency. With an
assumed population size of 1,000,000 the frequency of each
new mutant was 0.000001, and this value was subtracted from
the frequency of the parental strategy. Population size is im-
portant in our simulations only because it affects the prob-
ability of strategy extinction: increasing population size de-
creases the probability that a rare strategy is eliminated,
whereas decreasing population size increases the probability
that a rare strategy is eliminated. However, because elimi-
nated strategies can arise again from mutation, population
size should have little effect on the equilibrium results, except
perhaps if population size were very small.
RESULTS
When Workers Eliminate Males
When workers bias the sex ratio by eliminating males,
queen-worker coevolution leads to equilibrium population
investment in females intermediate between the equilibria
generally predicted for queens (0.5) and workers (0.75) (Fig.
3A). Surprisingly, equilibrium values are largely determined
by the degree that mutations affected queen and worker bi-
asing strategies. Population sex allocation is substantially in
favor of females when mutations have a larger effect on work-
er biasing than queen biasing (0.05: 0.1), intermediate be-
tween the queen and worker equilibria when mutations have
an equal effect on queens and worker biasing (0.05: 0.05),
and close to equal investment in the sexes when mutations
have a larger effect on queen biasing than on worker biasing
(0.05: 0.025) (Fig. 3A).
The degree that mutations affect biasing also determines
patterns of variation in individual queen and worker strate-
gies. When mutations have a larger effect on workers than
queens, queens evolve a single biasing strategy, while work-
ers evolve two divergent strategies, with workers that do not
bias and workers that generally eliminate all males (Fig. 4A).
These alternative worker strategies result in split colony sex
ratios, with some colonies producing both sexes and others
producing all-female broods (Fig. 5A).
The sex ratio in colonies producing a mixed sex brood
depends on how much queens bias the primary sex ratio in
favor of males. Queens bias more at lower costs than at higher
costs, and colonies produce a larger proportion of males when
queen costs are low than when queen costs are high (Fig.
5A). However, because one worker strategy eliminates all
males, the amount that queens can bias is also constrained
by brood reduction. Queens can only bias adaptively up to
a point BQ 5 20.3 because in the presence of workers that
eliminate all males, any further queen bias would result in
the high cost associated with brood reduction (Fig. 1). The
one exception to the evolution of a single queen biasing and
alternative worker biasing strategies occurs when queen costs
are very high (CQ 5 0.5), in which case queens, and not
workers, evolve alternative biasing strategies (Fig. 5A). The
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FIG. 3. Equilibrium population investment in the sexes from simulations using different queen and worker biasing costs (QC, WC).
Dashed lines indicate the theoretical equilibrium for queens (0.5) and workers (0.75) predicted from earlier models that assume biasing
has no costs (e.g., Trivers and Hare 1976).
1Incremental changes in the amount of bias are assumed equal for queen and worker mutant strategies (0.05: 0.05, queen: worker).
2Incremental changes in the amount of bias by queen mutant strategies are assumed to be greater than those of workers (0.05: 0.025,
queen: worker).
3Incremental changes in the amount of bias by queen mutant strategies are assumed to be less than those of workers (0.05: 0.1, queen:
worker).
degree of worker bias is equally affected by costs of manip-
ulation, with increasing worker costs resulting in reduction
of the frequency of the worker strategy eliminating all males,
and decreased population level female-bias (Fig. 3A).
Alternative biasing strategies and split colony sex ratios
also evolve when mutations have a larger effect on queens
than workers (Figs. 4B, 5B). In these cases, two alternative
queen strategies evolve, one that does not bias and another
that generally produces only male eggs (Fig. 4B). The equi-
librium worker response is a single biasing strategy, con-
sisting of eliminating as many males as possible without
reducing the reproductive brood (BW 5 0.8; Figs. 1, 4B). As
a result of queen and worker biasing, some colonies produce
only males and others produce female-biased broods (Fig.
5B). At the population level, increasing queen biasing costs
results in a decreasing frequency of queens producing only
male eggs and increased investment in females (Fig. 3A).
Although monomorphic worker biasing and strong diver-
gence in queen biasing strategies are the general rule when
mutations have a larger effect on queens than workers, there
are two exceptions. First, workers bias strongly at equilibrium
(BW 5 0.875) when costs are low for both queens and workers
(CQ 5 CW 5 0.1), whereas the queen strategy that biases does
so at a reduced level (BQ 5 20.4), resulting in only a moderate
split in colony sex ratios (Fig. 5B). The degree of queen bias
is limited by the costs associated with lower production of
reproductive brood (Fig 1A). Second, when worker costs are
high relative to queen costs (CW 5 0.4), both queens and
workers evolve alternative biasing strategies. One queen strat-
egy produces only male eggs while the other does not bias,
and one worker strategy eliminates most males while the other
does not bias. Because both queens and workers evolve a
nonbiasing strategy, four colony phenotypes occur, one pro-
ducing mostly females, two producing only males, and one
producing both sexes at equal frequency (Fig. 5B). When
worker cost increases even more (CW 5 0.5), only workers
evolve alternative biasing strategies. Here, one worker strategy
generally eliminates all male eggs and the other does not bias,
whereas queens evolve a single biasing strategy, resulting in
all female- and male-biased broods (Fig. 5B).
When mutations have an equal effect on queen and worker
biasing, neither queens nor workers evolve alternative biasing
strategies and colony investment is unimodal unless worker
costs are substantially greater than queen costs (Figs. 4C,
5C). Over the range of costs in which unimodal investment
occurs, population investment remains stable; both workers
and queens bias as much as possible without reducing the
reproductive brood (BQ 5 20.35, BW 5 0.9; Figs. 1, 3A).
Increasing worker costs relative to queen costs results in split
sex ratios either because of alternative queen strategies (for
CW 5 0.4), or because of alternative worker strategies (for
CW 5 0.5; Fig. 5C).
When Workers Increase Female Production
When workers increase the production of females, they
always bias maximally at equilibrium (BW 5 1), regardless
of costs. The equilibrium queen response depends on their
cost of biasing relative to that of workers. When queen costs
exceed worker costs, queens evolve alternative strategies with
some queens producing only male eggs and the others not
biasing. In this case, some colonies produce all males and
others a female-biased sex ratio (Fig. 6). The proportion of
queens biasing to an all-male primary sex ratio (and hence
the proportion of colonies producing only males) decreases
with increasing cost of queen biasing (Fig. 6), explaining
why investment in females increases in the population (Fig.
3B). When queen costs are less than or equal to worker costs,
queens do not exhibit alternative biasing strategies at equi-
librium. Colony sex ratios are always unimodal and male
biased (Figs. 3B, 5). Varying the magnitude of mutant effects
on queen versus worker biasing strategies has no effect on
equilibrium outcomes.
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FIG. 4. Representative simulation results of the coevolution of sex-ratio biasing by queens and workers over time. In these results,
workers bias by eliminating males. The cost parameter for queens (CQ) is 0.1 while the cost parameter for workers (CW) is 0.3. Results
are shown for (A) every 200 generations, (B) 1000 generations, or (C) 500 generations. Bars are alternately gray and white to aid in
distinguishing between adjacent bars.
1Incremental changes in the amount of bias by queen mutant strategies are assumed to be less than those of workers (0.05:0.1, queen:
worker).
2Incremental changes in the amount of bias by queen mutant strategies are assumed to be greater than those of workers (0.05:0.025,
queen: worker).
3Incremental changes in the amount of bias are assumed equal for queen and worker mutant strategies (0.05:0.05, queen: worker).
4When the percent queen bias is zero, queens do not bias and produce an equal frequency of male and female eggs (BQ 5 0). Increasing
queen bias results in increasing the proportion of male eggs, and when percent queen bias is 100 (BQ 5 20.5), they produce only male
eggs. When the percent worker bias is zero (BW 5 0), workers do not bias. Increasing worker bias results in increasing elimination of
males, and when percent worker bias is 100, they eliminate all males (BW 5 1.0).
2633EVOLUTION OF SPLIT SEX RATIOS
FIG. 5. Equilibrium colony investment in the sexes from simulations using different queen and worker biasing costs (QC, WC) when
workers bias by eliminating males. Bars are alternately gray and white to aid in distinguishing between adjacent bars.
1Incremental changes in the amount of bias by queen mutant strategies are assumed to be less than those of workers (0.05:0.1, queen:
worker).
2Incremental changes in the amount of bias by queen mutant strategies are assumed to be greater than those of workers (0.05:0.025,
queen: worker).
3Incremental changes in the amount of bias are assumed equal for queen and worker mutant strategies (0.05:0.05, queen: worker).
DISCUSSION
The Evolution of Alternative Biasing Strategies
In our study, we modeled the resolution of queen-worker
conflict over sex allocation. We asked how colony and pop-
ulation sex ratios evolve in response to three factors: the
mechanism of sex-ratio biasing, the varying costs that queen
and worker biasing incur, and the quantitative effect of mu-
tant strategies. In evolutionary simulations, we find that split
sex ratios occur frequently. Importantly, they are not inherent
in our simulation procedure, because simulations with no
costs consistently lead to monomorphic strategies (data not
shown). Rather, the occurrence of split sex ratios depends
qualitatively and quantitatively upon the evolutionary tra-
jectory of queen and worker biasing, which in turn is dictated
by the costs and benefits of biasing and the degree to which
mutations increase queen and worker biasing.
In our simulations, investment in the sexes is initially equal
and directional selection acts on workers to increase invest-
ment in females. This initiates a coevolutionary tug-of-war
over sex allocation in which queens attempt to decrease fe-
male production while workers attempt to increase it (Fig.
4). If workers bias by eliminating males and the rate of evo-
lutionary change is the same for queen and workers, this often
results in a stalemate in which neither achieves their equi-
librium investment and unimodal colony sex ratios occur.
However, if one caste can evolve more rapidly and achieve
its population-wide equilibrium, then strategies that deviate
from the equilibrium on both sides (more male investment
and more female investment) are favored, initiating strategy
divergence and split colony sex ratios. Strategy divergence
also occurs in queens when workers bias by directly increas-
ing female caste determination.
Disruptive selection and strategy divergence occurs when
2634 KEN R. HELMS ET AL.
FIG. 6. Equilibrium colony investment in the sexes from simu-
lations using different queen and worker biasing costs (QC, WC)
when workers bias by increasing female production. Bars are al-
ternately gray and white to aid in distinguishing between adjacent
bars.
the benefit of biasing for queens (increased male production
opposing worker bias) or workers (increased female produc-
tion opposing queen bias) accelerates with increasing bias.
For workers this occurs when they eliminate males and for
queens it occurs under both worker-biasing mechanisms
(Figs. 7A,B,D). Because the cost of biasing increases in a
linear manner, accelerating benefits result in biasing becom-
ing increasingly cost-effective with increasing bias, meaning
that the more one biases, the less it costs per unit effect.
Increasing cost effectiveness causes disruptive selection in
biasing strategies once the population has reached the pop-
ulation-level sex ratio equilibrium. At this point, strategies
deviating from the population-level equilibrium have greater
fitness than a strategy matching it. Strategies biasing beyond
the equilibrium gain because they benefit from increasing
cost efficiency and a greater proportion of the preferred sex.
In contrast, strategies biasing less than the equilibrium have
greater fitness because they have smaller overall biasing costs
and benefit from greater colony productivity. Despite the di-
vergence of individual strategies, a population-level equilib-
rium in sex allocation is maintained by selection on the fre-
quency of the divergent alternative strategies (also see Reuter
et al. 2004).
When workers bias by eliminating males, both queens and
workers exhibit accelerating benefits and yet only one caste
generally evolves alternative strategies. This occurs because
the caste that first reaches an equilibrium evolves alternative
strategies first, and then the other caste cannot bias strongly
enough to reach their equilibrium without causing brood re-
duction (i.e., where BW . BLimit). For example, one of two
alternative queen strategies is the production of an all-male
sex ratio, which constrains workers to levels of male elim-
ination that do not result in brood reduction in all-male col-
onies. Similarly, one of two alternative worker strategies is
to eliminate all males. This strategy prevents queens from
evolving strongly male-biased egg sex ratios because this
would also result in brood reduction.
The reason that neither caste generally evolves alternative
strategies when mutations have an equal effect on queen and
worker biasing is that population equilibria for each caste
increase at approximately the same rate as biasing by the
opposing caste. At any point where biasing by one caste
exceeds their equilibrium (initiating strategy divergence), the
other caste also biases equally strongly, resetting the degree
of bias necessary to reach equilibrium to a higher value.
Accordingly, divergence is no longer favored and directional
selection again acts to increase bias towards the new equi-
librium, with the effect that each caste prevents the other
from evolving strategy divergence. The end result is that
neither caste evolves alternative strategies and at equilibrium
both queens and workers bias as much as possible without
reducing the reproductive brood.
Which caste reaches their equilibrium first, and thus which
caste evolves alternative strategies, depends partly on the rate
at which strategies can evolve, with the caste exhibiting larger
mutational changes in biasing reaching equilibrium more
quickly. Accordingly, alternative queen strategies tend to
evolve when the effects of mutations are greater in queens
than workers, and workers evolve alternative strategies in the
opposite case (Figs. 4A,B, 5, and 6). However, the cost of
biasing is another determinant of how quickly each caste
reaches equilibrium. With large costs, changes in colony in-
vestment generate costs that outweigh the benefit of biasing
(Reuter et al. 2004), resulting in a population equilibrium
occurring at low bias, and early initiation of strategy diver-
gence. This is evidenced by our finding that extreme differ-
ences in costs between castes can reverse the effect of dif-
ferences in the degree to which mutation affects bias. Larger
mutational steps in workers than queens, for example, usually
lead to divergent worker strategies. However, strategy di-
vergence is observed in queen and not worker strategies when
biasing is much more costly for queens than workers, and in
worker but not queen strategies when biasing is much more
costly for workers than queens.
When workers bias by increasing female production, the
costs of biasing are also important in explaining why queens
do not evolve alternative biasing strategies when their biasing
costs are less than those of workers (Fig. 6). The reason is
that increasing queen bias decreases the availability of diploid
eggs, which decreases the degree that workers can bias.
Hence, increased queen bias at low cost prevents workers
from biasing at higher cost, and colony productivity increases
with increasing queen bias. Under this condition, a queen
strategy that biases beyond a population equilibrium will still
bias more cost-effectively than biasing at equilibrium; how-
ever, a strategy biasing below the equilibrium will not have
lower costs, and this prevents the evolution of alternative
strategies.
The cost-saving effect of increasing queen bias is also the
cause of male-biased population-level investment when
workers bias by increasing female production (Fig. 3B).
When worker costs are greater than queen costs, queens’ bias
2635EVOLUTION OF SPLIT SEX RATIOS
FIG. 7. Changes in final colony investment in the sexes according to how much queens and worker bias. (A) and (C) According to
worker bias at various degrees of queen bias. (B) and (D) According to queen bias at various degrees of worker bias. PQM is the proportion
queen bias, where PQM 5 0.0 corresponds to a lack of queen biasing and a primary (egg) sex ratio of equality (i.e., l), and PQM 5 1.0
corresponds to maximal queen bias and the production of only male eggs. BW is the proportion of males that workers eliminate. Secondary(final) sex ratios are derived from equations (2) and (3).
beyond what would result in equal investment in the sexes
because the sum of queen and worker costs are less than
when biasing to the point of equal investment. This result
may seem odd, because the fitness of both queens and workers
would be greater if neither biased at all. However, it occurs
because a mutant queen strategy producing fewer male eggs
(resulting in more equal population investment) would in-
crease the amount workers can effectively bias, which would
again select for increased queen bias.
Given the importance that the effects of mutations on bi-
asing have for the resolution of sex-ratio conflict, the question
arises whether in nature queens and workers ever differ in
this regard. In the absence of any knowledge of the genetics
of queen and worker behavior, it is obviously impossible to
make any definite statement on this point. However, assuming
that queens and workers utilize substantially different mech-
anisms to bias colony investment, the genetic basis for these
traits and the numbers of genes involved in their expression
are likely to differ. If so, those differences could frequently
result in differences in the degree that mutations affect bi-
asing phenotypes, and thus in differences in the rate at which
queen and worker biasing strategies can evolve. Nevertheless,
it is important to note that the quantitative effects of muta-
tions on queen and worker biasing strategies could vary over
time rather than exhibiting the consistency we model. If mu-
tations vary such that they sometimes have a greater effect
on queen biasing while sometimes having a greater effect on
worker biasing, the overall rate of evolutionary change re-
sulting from the effects of mutations on biasing will become
more equal for queens and workers, which should decrease
the probability of disruptive selection and the evolution of
alternative biasing strategies.
Central to our study is the assumption that eggs are limited
but that queens must produce them in excess of those that
can be reared as reproductives. In our simulations, we as-
sumed that eggs were five times more frequent than those
that can be reared as reproductives. What happens when eggs
are more or less frequent? When workers eliminate males,
lower egg availability reduces the probability that queens or
workers can bias to the degree necessary to reach a population
equilibrium prior to the point where the cost of brood re-
duction prohibits further biasing (Figs. 1, 2). Lower egg avail-
ability thus reduces the probability of the evolution of al-
ternative biasing strategies and split colony sex ratios (Fig.
1). Conversely, increased egg availability increases that prob-
ability. However, both cases also depend upon the relative
effect of queen versus worker mutations. At any given ratio
of available to reared eggs greater than one, larger differences
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in the effects of mutations increases the probability of the
evolution of split colony sex ratios, while a lesser difference
decreases that probability.
It is important to note that Roisin and Aron (2003) have
also recently modeled a case in which queens bias the primary
sex ratio and workers eliminate males to bias the secondary
sex ratio. Their study also predicted the evolution of alter-
native queen (but not worker) biasing strategies. However,
their analytical approach and conclusions differ greatly from
ours. Most important, they did not consider worker biasing
to have costs, and costs were only attributed to queens and
occurred only if they produced fewer diploid eggs than nec-
essary to optimize worker production (Roisin and Aron
2003).
Study Predictions
Our study shows that the evolution of queen-worker con-
flict can involve considerable complexity. However, there are
at least three clearly testable predictions. First, our study
predicts that the nature of split colony sex ratios at or near
equilibrium should be diagnostic of whether queens or work-
ers exhibit alternative biasing strategies. Strongly male-bi-
ased broods co-occurring with more mixed-sex broods should
indicate that queens exhibit alternative biasing strategies.
Conversely, strongly female-biased broods co-occurring with
more mixed-sex broods should indicate that workers exhibit
alternative biasing strategies. There is a clear need for ex-
periments to test for the presence of alternative biasing strat-
egies and to determine whether queens or workers exhibit
them. There is, however, evidence that they exist, and there
are procedures for discovering them (Helms et al. 2000; Pas-
sera et al. 2001).
Second, our study predicts that colonies producing an ex-
treme sex-ratio bias will be less productive than colonies
producing a greater mix of the two sexes. When queens ex-
hibit alternative biasing strategies and workers do not, a col-
ony phenotype with strongly male-biased investment results
from biasing queens co-occurring with biasing workers, and
the cost in colony productivity is the sum of both queen and
worker costs. Because only workers bias in colonies pro-
ducing more mixed-sex broods, colony productivity will be
greater. Just the opposite should occur when workers exhibit
alternative biasing strategies. In this case, colonies producing
strongly female-biased sex ratios will contain queens and
workers that bias, and will thus be less productive than col-
onies with more mixed-sex broods, where only queens bias.
Third, when workers bias by eliminating males, our study
also predicts an association between whether queens or work-
ers exhibit alternative biasing strategies and population sex
allocation. The evolution of alternative biasing strategies in
queens reduces the ability of workers to effectively influence
the sex ratio, resulting in population level sex allocation clos-
er to equality than to 0.75 (Fig. 3A). In contrast, the evolution
of alternative biasing strategies in workers reduces the ability
of queens to effectively influence the sex ratio, resulting in
population level sex allocation closer to 0.75 than to equality
(Fig. 3A). Whether this is the case could be tested with in-
dividual populations or, because strong estimates of popu-
lation investment are often difficult for eusocial Hymenoptera
(Boomsma 1989, Helms 1994), with comparative analyses
among populations or species where either queens or workers
exhibit alternative biasing strategies.
It is important to note that not all of these predictions are
unique to our models. For example, strongly male-biased
broods co-occurring with more mixed-sex broods may also
be predicted under sex ratio compensation when some col-
onies lose their queen (Taylor 1981). Queen loss could also
result in lower productivity in colonies producing extremely
male-biased broods. However, sex ratio compensation
uniquely predicts that male producing colonies will lack a
functional queen. Split colony sex ratios may also occur be-
cause workers bias the colony sex ratio according to variable
relatedness asymmetry (Boomsma and Grafen 1991). Given
various conditions, this model can predict a variety of colony
sex ratios consistent with our results. However, the variable
relatedness asymmetry model uniquely predicts that relat-
edness asymmetry will be greater in colonies producing pri-
marily or exclusively females than in those producing pri-
marily or exclusively males’ (Boomsma and Grafen 1991).
It also fails to predict the evolution of alternative queen bi-
asing strategies or an association between colony sex ratio
and colony productivity in the direction predicted by our
results.
Split sex ratios have also been hypothesized to result from
local mate competition (LMC) or local resource competition
(LRC), where the rate of return on investment in the sexes
differs according to overall colony investment (Frank 1987).
Under LMC, small colonies are predicted to produce only
males and larger colonies both sexes; and colonies producing
extremely male-biased sex ratios should be less productive
than colonies producing a greater mix of the two sexes (Frank
1987). Under LRC, small colonies are predicted to produce
only females and larger colonies a mix of the two sexes; and
colonies producing extremely female-biased sex ratios should
be less productive than colonies producing a greater mix of
the two sexes (Frank 1987). These are also predictions of our
model. However, the LMC and LRC models do not predict
any clear association between whether queens or workers
exhibit alternative biasing strategies and colony sex ratio. In
addition, our prediction that queens will exhibit alternative
biasing strategies in populations in which population in-
vestment in the sexes is near equal, while workers will exhibit
alternative biasing strategies in populations in which in-
vestment is substantially female-biased, appears unique in
existing theory.
Alternative Mechanisms and Social Structures
Our study focuses on biasing the primary sex ratio as the
mechanism of queen bias. However, in small colony Hy-
menoptera other mechanisms, including direct queen policing
of worker behavior, might be possible and how our conclu-
sions may apply to such cases is unclear. In addition, our
study has focused on a simple social structure where workers
are sterile and colonies have a single queen inseminated by
a single male, excluding any variation in relatedness. What
our models might predict for eusocial Hymenoptera with al-
ternative social structures remains to be determined. When
multiple mating by queens or multiple reproductive queens
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per colony are frequent, alternative queen and/or worker strat-
egies might often occur within single colonies, and outcomes
may depend upon factors such as the relatedness and degree
of reproductive skew among queens and behavioral domi-
nance among worker phenotypes. In addition, variable re-
latedness asymmetry within populations can result in the evo-
lution of split colony sex ratios (Boomsma and Grafen 1991),
and how the mechanisms we address might influence that
process remains to be explored. However, our approach of
analyzing queen-worker conflict from a mechanistic per-
spective provides a foundation for addressing such questions
and for studying of the evolution of sex allocation over a
variety of different social structures.
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APPENDIX
Simulation procedures for the evolution of queen-worker sex al-
location conflict.
Our simulation procedure first randomly pairs queen and worker
strategies within colonies, and the frequency of each of these col-
onies is determined by multiplying the population frequency of the
queen strategies by the population frequency of the worker strat-
egies. Colony sex ratios are calculated for all colonies (1–N) from
either equation (2) or (3), depending upon how workers bias. The
population sex ratio is then determined by multiplying the frequency
(f) of each colony phenotype by the proportion females they pro-
duce ( f ) by the proportion of resources invested in reproduction
(1 2 gQW) and summing that value across all colony phenotypes,
that is, by:
ColonyQ WN N
Population Investment In Females 5 f f (1 2 g )O O QW
ColonyQ W1 1
Population investment in males is determined the same way, except
investment in males is 1 2 f:
ColonyQ WN N
Population Investment In Males 5 f(1 2 f )(1 2 g )O O QW
ColonyQ W1 1
The proportional investment in females within the population (F)
is then determined by:
F 5 Population Investment In Females1 2O
4 Population Investment In Females1O
1 Population Investment In Males2O
It is important to note that population investment in females (F) is
not simply the sum of the proportion investment in females, because
different colonies can bias differently and have different costs, and
as a result, investments have to weighted by colony productivity.
Once F is determined, the fitness of queen and worker strategies
is determined in all of the colony phenotypes. The frequency of
each queen strategy in the next generation is then calculated by the
sum of their frequency in the last generation multiplied by their
fitness in the current generation (aQ). For each queen strategy, this
is divided by the sum of the frequency of all queen strategies in
the last generation (fQ) multiplied by their fitness in the current
generation. The frequency of queen strategy 1 in the next generation
(Q1(New)) is:
ColonyQ W1 N
f aO Q Q
ColonyQ W1 1Q 51(New) ColonyQ WN N
f aO Q Q
ColonyQ W1 1
The frequency of each worker strategy in the next generation is
calculated by using the same procedure as for queens. The new
frequency of worker strategy 1 is:
ColonyQ WN 1
f aO W W
ColonyQ W1 1W 51(New) ColonyQ WN N
f aO W W
ColonyQ W1 1
The simulation then uses the new frequencies of queen and worker
strategies to form new colony phenotypes, and the simulation pro-
cedure is repeated until the number of generations specified has
been completed. The simulation then provides output on the final
frequency of the different queen and worker strategies, the final
frequency of the colony phenotypes, the final fitness of the queen
and worker strategies, population investment (F), and colony in-
vestment by each of the colony phenotypes.
